In our next war, our war with Spain in 1898, England saved us from
Germany. She did it from first to last; her position was unmistakable, and
every determining act of hers was as our friend. The service that she
rendered us in warning Germany to keep out of it, was even greater than
her suggestion of our Monroe doctrine in 1823; for in 1823 she put us on
guard against meditated, but remote, assault from Europe, while in 1898
she actively averted a serious and imminent peril. As the threat of her
fleet had obstructed Napoleon in 1803, and the Holy Alliance in 1823, so
in 1898 it blocked the Kaiser. Late in that year, when it was all over,
the disappointed and baffled Kaiser wrote to a friend of Joseph
Chamberlain, “If I had had a larger fleet I would have taken Uncle Sam by
the scruff of the neck.” Have you ever read what our own fleet was like in
those days? Or our Army? Lucky it was for us that we had to deal only with
Spain. And even the Spanish fleet would have been a much graver opponent
in Manila Bay, but for Lord Cromer. On its way from Spain through the Suez
Canal a formidable part of Spain’s navy stopped to coal at Port Said.
There is a law about the coaling of belligerent warships in neutral ports.
Lord Cromer could have construed that law just as well against us. His
construction brought it about that those Spanish ships couldn’t get to
Manila Bay in time to take part against Admiral Dewey. The Spanish War
revealed that our Navy could hit eight times out of a hundred, and was in
other respects unprepared and utterly inadequate to cope with a
first-class power. In consequence of this, and the criticisms of our Navy
Department, which Admiral Sims as a young man had written, Roosevelt took
the steps he did in his first term. Three ticklish times in that Spanish
War England stood our friend against Germany. When it broke out, German
agents approached Mr. Balfour, proposing that England join in a European
combination in Spain’s favor. Mr. Balfour’s refusal is common knowledge,
except to the monomaniac with his complex. Next came the action of Lord
Cromer, and finally that moment in Manila Bay when England took her stand
by our side and Germany saw she would have to fight us both, if she fought
at all.
If you saw any German or French papers at the time of our troubles with
Spain, you saw undisguised hostility. If you have talked with any American
who was in Paris during that April of 1898, your impression will be more
vivid still. There was an outburst of European hate for us. Germany,
France, and Austria all looked expectantly to England—and England
disappointed their expectations. The British Press was as much for us as
the French and German press were hostile; the London Spectator said: “We
are not, and we do not pretend to be, an agreeable people, but when there
is trouble in the family, we know where our hearts are.”
In those same days (somewhere about the third week in April, 1898), at the
British Embassy in Washington, occurred a scene of significance and
interest, which has probably been told less often than that interview
between Mr. Balfour and the Kaiser’s emissary in London. The British
Ambassador was standing at his window, looking out at the German Embassy,
across the street. With him was a member of his diplomatic household. The
two watched what was happening. One by one, the representatives of various
European nations were entering the door of the German Embassy. “Do you see
them?” said the Ambassador’s companion; “they’ll all be in there soon.
There. That’s the last of them.” “I didn’t notice the French Ambassador.”
“Yes, he’s gone in, too.” “I’m surprised at that. I’m sorry for that. I
didn’t think he would be one of them,” said the British ambassador. “Now,
I’ll tell you what. They’ll all be coming over here in a little while. I
want you to wait and be present.” Shortly this prediction was verified.
Over from the German Embassy came the whole company on a visit to the
British Ambassador, that he might add his signature to a document to which
they had affixed theirs. He read it quietly. We may easily imagine its
purport, since we know of the meditated European coalition against us at
she time of our war with Spain. Then the British Ambassador remarked: “I
have no orders from my Government to sign any such document as that. And
if I did have, I should resign my post rather than sign it.” A pause: The
company fell silent. “Then what will your Excellency do?” inquired one
visitor. “If you will all do me the honor of coming back to-morrow, I
shall have another document ready which all of us can sign.” That is what
happened to the European coalition at this end.
Some few years later, that British Ambassador came to die; and to the
British Embassy repaired Theodore Roosevelt. “Would it be possible for us
to arrange,” he said, “a funeral more honored and marked than the United
States has ever accorded to any one not a citizen? I should like it. And,”
he suddenly added, shaking his fist at the German Embassy over the way,
“I’d like to grind all their noses in the dirt.”
Confronted with the awkward fact that Britain was almost unanimously with
us, from Mr. Balfour down through the British press to the British people,
those nations whose ambassadors had paid so unsuccessful a call at the
British Embassy had to give it up. Their coalition never came off. Such a
thing couldn’t come off without England, and England said No.
Next, Lord Cromer, at Port Said, stretched out the arm of international
law, and laid it upon the Spanish fleet. Belligerents may legally take
coal enough at neutral ports to reach their nearest “home port.” That
Spanish fleet was on its way from Spain to Manila through the Suez Canal.
It could have reached there, had Lord Cromer allowed it coal enough to
make the nearest home port ahead of it—Manila. But there was a home
port behind it, still nearer, namely, Barcelona. He let it take coal
enough to get back to Barcelona. Thus, England again stepped in.
The third time was in Manila Bay itself, after Dewey’s victory, and while
he was in occupation of the place. Once more the Kaiser tried it, not
discouraged by his failure with Mr. Balfour and the British Government. He
desired the Philippines for himself; we had not yet acquired them; we were
policing them, superintending the harbor, administering whatever had
fallen to us from Spain’s defeat. The Kaiser sent, under Admiral Diedrich,
a squadron stronger than Dewey’s.
Dewey indicated where the German was to anchor. “I am here by the order of
his Majesty the German Emperor,” said Diedrich, and chose his own place to
anchor. He made it quite plain in other ways that he was taking no orders
from America. Dewey, so report has it, at last told him that “if he wanted
a fight he could have it at the drop of the hat.” Then it was that the
German called on the English Admiral, Chichester, who was likewise at
hand, anchored in Manila Bay. “What would you do,” inquired Diedrich, “in
the event of trouble between Admiral Dewey and myself?” “That is a secret
known only to Admiral Dewey and me,” said the Englishman. Plainer talk
could hardly be. Diedrich, though a German, understood it. He returned to
his flagship. What he saw next morning was the British cruiser in a new
place, interposed between Dewey and himself. Once more, he understood; and
he and his squadron sailed off; and it was soon after this incident that
the disappointed Kaiser wrote that, if only his fleet had been larger, he
would have taken us by the scruff of the neck.
Tell these things to the next man you hear talking about George III or the
Alabama. You may meet him in front of a bulletin board, or in a
drawing-room. He is amongst us everywhere, in the street and in the house.
He may be a paid propagandist or merely a silly ignorant puppet. But
whatever he is, he will not find much to say in response, unless it be
vain, sterile chatter. True come-back will fail him as it failed that man
by the bulletin board who asked, “What is England doing, anyhow?” and his
neighbor answered, “Her fleet’s keeping the Kaiser out of your front
yard.”
